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As set forth in Plaintiffs’ Opening Brief, the court below decided to treat Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
as a Motion for Summary Judgment, and proceeded, with no evidence before it other than the emergency room
Contract, to summarily adjudicate that the Contract’s pricing term was the hospital’s Chargemaster, that
Plaintiffs were properly billed, and that there was no element of procedural or substantive unconscionability. In
its opposition brief, Defendant simply regurgitates the ruling of the lower court and fails to adequately address
the issues raised by Plaintiffs and presented on appeal. Despite the extensive rhetoric contained in Defendant’s
brief, it is most noteworthy for the arguments which Defendant failed to address. Most significant among the
items that this appellate court should consider are the following:
1. The court below unilaterally decided it would treat Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as a Motion for Summary
Judgment, over the opposition of both parties, and without any evidentiary record other than Defendant’s
Contract. Defendant does not discuss the lack of an evidentiary record, or the impropriety of ruling with any
evidentiary record on which to issue Summary Judgment. Nevertheless, the order of the court below
acknowledged that other than the Declaration of Keely E. Duke, which did nothing more than provide a copy of
the Contract to the court, there was no evidence on which to rule.
2. The court’s ruling as to the Contract Interpretation issue failed to mention, much less consider, the “plain
meaning” of the term “all charges,” and Defendant fails to address such “plain meaning.”
3. The court ruled on the Contract Interpretation issue without any mention or consideration of the intentions of
either party, specifically concluding that all signing patients agreed to pay for hospital services at Chargemaster
rates. Regardless of the court’s ruling, Defendant, by drafting a contract applicable to all emergency room
patients, and with full knowledge that Medicare, Medicaid, and Insured patients were subject to governmentally
mandated rate schedule and negotiated rate schedules, could not have intended that patients signing its Contract
would be subject to Chargemaster rates. Likewise, there is no basis on which to find that signing patients had
any intention to be bound by a grossly excessive rate schedule that was not mentioned in the Contract and which
very few patients, if any, had ever heard of. The Contract itself mentions no price schedule for any signing
patients, and its only reference to financial liability appears as an oblique reference to the financial liability of
patients having Third-Party Payor coverage, as follows:
I further understand and agree that I am financially responsible for payment of all charges incurred
which are not paid by any Third—Party Payors (with such charges payable upon discharge unless other
arrangements have been made in advance), including, any and all products provided or services
rendered to Patient which are not eligible for payment by any Third-Party Payors (e.g., services
rendered by health care providers who do not participate with Patient‘s insurance plan).
Defendant’s brief offers no logical basis to interpret this provision, and particularly the words “all charges
incurred” as a promise by signing patients to pay for services at the “gross charges” contained in the hospital’s
Charge Description Master or at any other rates.
4. The court ruled on the interpretation of Defendant’s agreement without acknowledging that the vast majority
of patients, including Medicare, Medicaid, and Insured patients, are subject to varying, pre-existing rate
schedules and not the hospitals “gross charges” as set forth in its Chargemaster. Thus, financial liability for the
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interpreting the Contract, or explain how Summary Judgment would be appropriate in face of a total lack of
evidence to support such a ruling.
Defendant’s Six Basic Arguments Presented In Its Opposition Brief Are Without Merit
1. Defendant claims that Plaintiffs waived any argument on appeal that the lower court
incorrectly treated Defendant’s Motion as a Motion for Summary Judgment.
While this argument is highly questionable, Plaintiffs do not object to this Court reviewing the lower
court’s Summary Judgment as to both issues raised by the complaint, the “Contract Interpretation theory” and
the “Unconscionability theory,” de novo.
Contract Interpretation
law:

In general, Contract Interpretation is based on some or all of the following, as set forth in applicable case
a. Intent of the parties;
b. The “plain English” and common usage of the words used in the contract;
c. Whether the Contract language at issue is ambiguous (i.e., has more than one reasonable
interpretation;
d. The document must be considered as a whole;
e. Whether an outside agreement is “incorporated by reference.”
In the instant action, the Contract speaks for itself and there is sufficient information for this Court to

reverse the decision of the court below and conclude that the Contract contains an “open price term” pursuant to
Idaho law. There are two grounds for doing so, either of which would render the same result. First, the Contract
does not contain an agreement for signing patients to pay for services at the hospitals “chargemaster rates” which
is self-evident from the face of the Contract itself. The Chargemaster is not identified, described, or even
mentioned in the Contract, and as shown below, there was no basis on which the court could rule that the
Contract provided for payment by signing patients at the hospital’s Chargemaster rates. Second, even if this
Court were to conclude that the Contract referred to the hospital’s Chargemaster (which it does not), the
Chargemaster would still not be the pricing term of the Contract because the the Chargemaster is not properly
“incorporated by reference” under established Idaho law.
Unconscionability
While there is no evidence, one way or the other, as to the unconscionability of Defendant’s billing
patients at Chargemaster rates, to the extent this Court considers the issue, Summary Judgment must be denied
for the admitted lack of any evidence. The only argument that can be made in the lack of any evidence is that
the motion must be denied. Defendant never intended that its Motion would be treated as a Summary Judgment
by the court below and admittedly never presented any evidence to support the conscionability of its billing
practices, its costs of providing services, its markup in its Chargemaster, etc. Therefore, with no testimony, no
declarations, no discovery, and no basis to support Summary Judgment, the lower court’s ruling, based on
nothing at all, must be reversed and Summary Judgment as to Unconscionability denied.
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2. Defendant claims that Plaintiffs lack standing because they did not seek a determination as to the
reasonable value of the services they were rendered or the amount the hospital had a right to bill them
This argument fails because the Declaratory Judgment Act does not require that Plaintiffs, in order to
seek a declaration that a contract contains an open price term, must simultaneously seek a determination of the
reasonable value of hospital services and the amount they owe the hospital. Determining the value of hospital
services furnished to Plaintiffs is not necessary in order to interpret the contract or conclude that billing at
Chargemaster rates is an unconscionable billing practice. Plaintiffs have a right to know the rights and duties of
both parties in this action, including the interpretation of Defendant’s form Contract, particularly where
Defendant’s widely used, form contract, impacts thousands of patients. The Declaratory Judgment Act
specifically provides for appropriate “further relief” in subsequent proceedings, where appropriate, and the
Court’s ruling would make it virtually impossible to challenge Defendant’s grossly excessive billing practices for
self-pay patients.
3. Defendant’s meritless argument that the “actual relief” requirement of justiciability was not met
because Plaintiffs did not pursue a determination of the reasonable value for services
Similar to the last argument, the relief sought by Plaintiffs in the instant action is not a determination of
the “reasonable value” for the services provided to Plaintiffs. Indeed, the issue of “reasonable value” does not
even arise unless, and until, the determination is first made that Plaintiffs’ theory is correct and the Contract
contains an “open price term.” The relief requested by Plaintiffs regarding the Contract interpretation theory is
that the Contract contains an “open price term.” If the Contract does not leave the price term open, the
“reasonable value” issue never arises, since the price term would be Chargemaster rates. The relief is requested
on Plaintiffs’ own behalf, and on behalf of a class of similar patients. Plaintiffs do not request a conclusive
resolution as to how much they owe the hospital and a judgment against themselves because it would make the
proceeding unfeasible to pursue, would harm themselves in the process, and virtually provide that no relief
would be obtained for other patients because a class would become unmanageable if individual value
determinations were required for all members of the putative class.
Defendant fails to meaningfully address this issue, simply contending that the Declaratory Judgment act
mandates that Plaintiffs pursue a “reasonable determination” without regard to its practicality, without regard to
Plaintiffs’ indication that only declaratory and injunctive relief are sought in this action, and ignoring the fact
that the Act itself provides for “further relief” when necessary or proper.
Further, the relief Plaintiffs seek is virtually the best possible relief obtainable. Plaintiffs request the
following relief, that the court below fails to address:
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40. Plaintiffs and members of the Class are entitled to a declaration that Defendant’s Contract does not
authorize Defendant to bill and demand payment from self-pay emergency care patients at its
Chargemaster rates.
41. Alternatively, even if Defendant’s Contract authorizes Defendant to bill Class members at its
Chargemaster rates, Plaintiffs and members of the Class are nevertheless entitled to a declaration that
Defendant’s practice of billing self-pay patients at such rates is unconscionable, and the Contract term
authorizing such charges unenforceable.
42. Plaintiffs and members of the Class are further entitled to a declaration that they are liable, under the
Contract, for no more than the reasonable value of the treatment/services provided.
Paragraph 47 of the complaint explains the purpose and benefits of the relief that Plaintiffs seek on behalf of
themselves and the class:
47. The declarations sought herein will substantially benefit Plaintiffs and the Class, since they will no
longer be subject to collection efforts based on the hospital’s Chargemaster rates. Significantly, while
Defendant has the right to claim the reasonable value of its services (Plaintiffs are not suggesting that
such services were provided gratuitously) under a quantum meruit theory or other equitable principles,
the burden of proving the reasonable value of Defendant’s services should rightly fall on Defendant, not
only as a result of its failure to include a definite pricing term in its standard Contract and its
unconscionable billing practices, but also because it is unreasonable and unfair to require a patient, billed
at a rate that was never agreed on and/or is unconscionable, to bring an individual lawsuit just to prove
the amount of money that he or she is obligated to pay. Further, Defendant is in a much better position
to prove and justify the reasonable value of its services than any individual patient would be, and has full
knowledge as to its costs and average reimbursement rates. Finally, the declarations sought herein
would benefit future self-pay emergency care patients of Defendant, by bringing about increased pricing
transparency and eliminating the unconscionable billing practices complained of.
4. Defendant claims that Plaintiffs’ theories have been considered and rejected by courts throughout the
country and Plaintiffs seek relief from the judicial branch for issues that have already been addressed by
the legislative branch
Both of these issues are wrong and untrue. Court decisions from other jurisdictions do not directly
address Plaintiffs’ theories, and hospital Contracts in other cases are not uniform in any event. Nor are any outof-state decisions binding on this court. Further, there are a multitude of cases that support a finding that a
Contract, such as the one used by Defendant, contains an “open price term.” The Court below describes two outof-state decisions at length, but these cases involve different parties and different contracts, and both were poorly
reasoned, as fully explained in Plaintiffs’ Opening brief. The court entirely failed to address the analogous cases
cited by Plaintiffs which found the hospital contract to contain an “open price term,” Defendant’s brief fails to
address any of the problems outlined by Plaintiffs with respect to the decisions mentioned by the court below as
“instructive.”
The fact is that hospital Consent Agreements vary widely in both their language and terms and a large
number directly refer to Chargemaster rates (or Chargemaster rates less an uninsured discount) for self-pay
patients. There is nothing that would prevent Defendant from using the term “Chargemaster” in its Contract as
the payment rate for hospital services, but Defendant chose not to do so.
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With regard to Defendant’s claim that the issues raised in the complaint have already been addressed by
the legislative branch, such claim is untrue. There is no regulation that sets hospital rates, or purports to control
the wording of hospital Consent Agreements, and Defendant has identified none.
5. Defendant claims that the undisputed facts established, as a matter of law, that the term “charges” was
sufficiently clear so as not to be an “open price” term.
Defendant refers to “undisputed facts” that simply don’t exist. There are no such “undisputed facts” in
this case. Simply arguing that the District Court was correct in its ruling does nothing to show that that lower
court’s ruling was correct.
6. Defendant’s claim that the lower court correctly rejected Plaintiffs’ claim that the Agreements were
unconscionable is without merit.
This argument fails for two separate reasons. First, assuming that the Court properly converted
Defendant’s Motion as a Summary Judgment motion, the initial burden is on Defendant to offer at least some
evidence, at a minimum, to support its motion and Defendant failed to supply any evidence at all to show the
lack of any amount of procedural unconscionability. Further, there exists a huge and obvious gap in bargaining
power between a major hospital and an emergency room patient. The hospital uses a standard, adhesive Contract
whose terms are set by the hospital and not subject to negotiation by individual patients, an emergency room
patient is, by definition, in a weakened state, etc. Thus, the court’s finding as to a lack of any element of
procedural unconscionability is erroneous on its face. Defendant offers nothing to back up the court’s erroneous
conclusion as to procedural unconscionability.
With regard to substantive unconscionability, there was no evidence before the court to support the
Court’s determination offered by Defendant, and the court’s ruling was erroneously based purely on the lack of
submission of any evidence as to substantive unconscionability within a 30 day period. In light of the brief time
and the lack of any mention by the court as to the issue of unconscionability in its initial memorandum decision,
there was nothing for Plaintiffs to respond to, and no indication that the court was seeking a response other than
to the document on which it determined it would treat the matter as a Summary Judgment proceeding. To rule
that Defendant’s billing at grossly excessive Chargemaster rates was conscionable as a matter of law is clearly
erroneous, particularly with zero evidence to support such ruling.
Further, even assuming the Court below correctly concluded that the Contract contained an agreement
for signing patients to pay for hospital services at Chargemaster rates, the court lacked any evidence on which to
determine whether or not payment to the hospital, based purely on Chargemaster rates, would be reasonable, and
did not mention or consider the reasonableness of Chargemaster rates in its ruling. Defendant’s brief offers no
additional support for the court’s erroneous ruling.
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Defendant’s Statement of the Case Contains False and Misleading Statements
Defendant claims that the term “Chargemaster” refers to Saint Alphonsus’“standard rate schedule” for
the services and goods Saint Alphonsus provides to patients. This statement is misleading at best. While every
hospital maintains a Chargemaster, such a document is not a “rate schedule.” Rate schedules concern payment
for services, and payment rates are generally based on pre-existing rate schedules that are governmentally
mandated (for Medicare and Medicaid patients) or negotiated (for insured patients). In these cases, the rate
schedules are found in documents outside of Defendant’s Contract, which provides for financial responsibility
but without specifying any particular rate schedule. Defendant’s reference to a “standard rates schedule” simply
introduces another meaningless and confusing term. It is also interesting to note that Defendant’s Contract
specifically refers to payment for “all charges incurred which are not paid by any Third-Party Payors.” This is
an obvious reference to negotiated insurer rates, and such rates are invariably discounted from the hospital
Chargemaster rates.
Defendant Fails to Present Any Reasonable Basis For The Court Below To Rule On Issues Where There
Was A Total Lack Of Evidence
In pages 8 through 12 of its Opposition, Defendant argues at length that the court’s Summary Judgment
ruling was appropriate even though Defendant had presented no evidence of any sort to the court and the court
lacked any basis for its ruling. The argument presented by Defendant to support the court’s misguided ruling is
simply wrong no matter how Defendant tries to spin it. As acknowledged by the trial court, Defendant offered
zero evidence on which the Court could conclude that Defendant’s billing practices were conscionable as a
matter of law. This includes zero evidence as to the intentions of either party with respect to the Contract’s
interpretation, zero evidence with regard to the adhesive nature of the Contract, zero evidence as to the ability of
patients to negotiated Contract terms, zero evidence as to what a Chargemaster is or what it contains, zero
evidence as to the knowledge of patients as to the existence or contents of Defendant’s Chargemaster, zero
evidence as to the reasonableness of the Chargemaster rates, zero evidence as to the value of hospital services for
Plaintiff or anyone else, zero evidence as to what patients actually pay for hospital services, zero evidence as to
the “availability” of the hospital’s Chargemaster in the emergency room setting, zero evidence as to the various
categories of emergency room patients (e.g., Medicare patients, Medicaid patients, Insured patients, Uninsured
patients), zero evidence as to the payment liability for each of the different patient categories, zero evidence as to
what amounts of the payment liability are historically paid by different categories of patients, zero evidence as to
the “plain meaning” and “common meaning” of the words used in Defendant’s standard Contract, etc. In
essence, the Court had no evidence on which to form an opinion, much less rule on the theories on which the
complaint was based, or to Summarily Adjudicate the entire case as a “matter of law.”
Defendant, in its brief, requests that in the event the trial court wrongly converted Defendant’s motion
into one for Summary Judgment, this court should consider the motion under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). However,
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Defendant fares no better under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), particularly since Plaintiffs are entitled to have all inferences
from the record viewed in their favor, and Defendant has made no showing that Plaintiffs cannot prove any set of
facts that would support the claims in the complaint.
The court’s ruling on Standing cannot stand
In its ruling, the lower court stated as follows:
“[T]he plaintiffs’ undisputed factual allegations meet two of the three threshold elements of standing.
The Court finds that the Complaint demonstrates an injury in fact and the existence of a sufficient causal
connection between the injury and the challenged conduct. However, the Court finds that the Complaint
is facially insufficient to establish a likelihood that the plaintiffs’ injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision. On this basis, the Court finds that the plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient to establish
standing to proceed in this matter.”
The court’s erroneous ruling that Plaintiffs lack standing in this action is fully addressed by Plaintiffs’
Opening brief. Defendant responds with two arguments. First, Defendant claims that “Plaintiffs failed to
establish standing because they had not alleged or put forth any evidence to show a likelihood that their claimed
injury will be redressed by a decision in their favor.” This is simply false. Plaintiffs clearly alleged that the
declarations sought would redress the improper billing practices complained of, and in the best manner possible.
Plaintiffs seek the following declarations herein:
(1) “Defendant’s Contract does not authorize Defendant to bill and demand payment from self-pay
emergency care patients at its Chargemaster rates;”
(2) “The Contract term authorizing such charges unenforceable;” and
(3) “The burden of proving the reasonable value of Defendant’s services should rightly fall on
Defendant.”
These declarations would directly redress the billing practices complained of, and the court’s finding that
the problems complained of would not be “redressed” by such declarations is wrong. Further, the court’s
holding that Plaintiffs, in order to fully redress the injuries complained of would have to seek a court finding as
to the “reasonable value” of Defendant’s services is not improper under the Declaratory Judgment Act, but is
absurd on its face. The time and expense of proving the “reasonable value” of Defendant’s services would make
this entire action completely unfeasible, and almost certainly result in an enforceable judgment against Plaintiffs
for such “reasonable value.”
Further, as a practical matter, the lower court’s ruling, if upheld, would make it virtually impossible for
any patient to ever challenge the propriety of Defendant’s self-serving Contract interpretation, since the
requirement to seek the reasonable value of hospital services would make any trial a complex, time consuming,
and expensive prospect for all parties and the court as well, invariably ending up with an enforceable judgment
against the patient bringing the action, and making class certification virtually impossible because a class action
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would arguably require thousands of individual trials to determine the “reasonable value” or services for each
individual class member.
Defendant next argues that “a declaration that Saint Alphonsus may only charge self-pay patients some
undetermined “reasonable value” of services would do nothing more than invite future litigation to determine
what “reasonable value” means and whether Saint Alphonsus’s charges, as reflected in its Chargemaster, are the
“reasonable value” for the hospital’s services under individual patient circumstances. This argument fails for
two reasons. First, Plaintiffs seek specific declarations, not some undetermined “reasonable value.” If the
contracts are unenforceable, they are unenforceable. What Defendant would do afterward to pursue the
collection of existing accounts would be up to Defendant. Defendant would certainly have the right to pursue
the reasonable value of its services through quantum meruit actions or individual negotiations, but this
constitutes “further relief” as set forth in the Declaratory Judgments Act. Further, Defendants argument that this
would “invite future litigation to determine reasonable value” of individual patients is pure speculation,
particularly since further relief is provided for in the Declaratory Judgments Act itself and not necessary in the
same action. The possibility of future litigation subsequent to a Declaratory Judgment has never been held to
constitute a basis for dismissal of the action, and Defendants have cited no such holdings.
Defendant next argues that “The declaratory relief Plaintiffs sought would amount to no more than an
advisory opinion based on a set of unknown and hypothetical facts.” This argument is wrong on its face. The
interpretation of a real, existing contract impacting thousands of existing accounts, including those of Plaintiffs,
is not theoretical or hypothetical, and is not an advisory opinion.
Defendant further argues that “[B]y avoiding a determination of the reasonable value of the services
provided, Plaintiffs also avoid the purpose and function of a declaratory relief claim: ‘to declare the rights, status
and legal relations of persons affected by contracts.’” In making this argument, Defendant simply ignores the
fact that Plaintiffs have the right to seek an interpretation of Defendant’s Contract without the need to pursue any
“further relief” within the same action. The court below was wrong in concluding that Plaintiffs must pursue a
determination of the “reasonable value” of the hospital services provided to them in order to have standing to
seek resolution of the Contract Interpretation and should be reversed for this reason alone. Obviously, Defendant
would like to see the court’s position adopted, but Defendant offers no argument or analysis which would
support such a conclusion and there is none. Further, Defendant fails to address to arguments offered by
Plaintiffs to show that there is no necessity to pursue a “reasonable value” determination in order seek a
Declaratory Judgment as to Contract’s meaning.
Note that there is an obvious inconsistency in the court’s holding that Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue
the existing action. If Plaintiffs truly lacked standing in this action, the lower court would have no jurisdiction to
issue a definitive ruling against them as to the interpretation of Defendant’s contract or the conscionability of its
billing practices. In any case, this court should reverse the court’s ruling that Plaintiffs lack standing in the
above matter because (1) Plaintiffs went to Defendant’s emergency room, (2) Plaintiffs signed the agreement at
issue, (3) Plaintiffs were billed by Defendant and sent to collections, (4) there exists an actual dispute over the
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proper meaning and interpretation of Defendant’s Contract, and (5) the declarations sought herein would directly
address the disputes raised in the complaint and provide the relief requested.
Defendant fails to directly address the following two pertinent provisions of the Declaratory Judgments
Act which show that Plaintiffs have no requirement to pursue “reasonable value” determinations of hospital
services:
§ 10-1201. Declaratory judgments authorized Form and effect. Courts of record within their respective
jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not further
relief is or could be claimed. . .
§ 10-1202. Person interested or affected may have declaration. Any person interested under a . . . written
contract . . .may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the . . .
contract . . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.
The pertinent two provisions pertaining to Plaintiffs’ need to pursue a determination as to the reasonable
value of hospital services are the statements “whether or not further relief is or could be claimed,” and the
statement that Plaintiffs may have determined “any question of construction or validity arising under the
contract.” Nothing in the Declaratory Judgment Act even remotely purports to require Plaintiffs to pursue a
determination of the reasonable value of hospital services as part of the instant action seeking the proper
construction or validity of Defendant’s Contract. The court’s imposition of this requirement, and it
corresponding conclusion that Plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory judgment must be dismissed because Plaintiff did
not seek such a determination is legally erroneous and must be reversed.
Indeed, the Restatement 2d of Judgments, § 33, Comment c, in pertinent part, addresses this same issue
as follows:
“A plaintiff who wins a declaratory judgment may go on to seek further relief, even in an action on the
same claim which prompted the action for a declaratory judgment. This further relief may include
damages which had accrued at the time the declaratory relief was sought; it is irrelevant that the further
relief could have been requested initially. See Illustration 1. Nonmerger is justified by arguments based
on the purpose of declaratory relief. A declaratory action is intended to provide a remedy that is simpler
and less harsh than coercive relief, if it appears that a declaration might terminate the potential
controversy. This idea that declaratory actions are to supplement rather than supersede other types of
litigation is fortified by the provisions of the Uniform and Federal Acts for "further relief" when
necessary or proper; these provisions represent a legislative scheme antithetical to merger (see §
26(1)(d)).”
Defendant argues that the declaration sought would not provide any guidance to the parties regarding
what amount Plaintiffs would be required to pay Saint Alphonsus, and thus this is not a justiciable controversy
because it will not result in a judgment of a conclusive character. This assertion is wrong. The declarations
sought, if granted, would invalidate the Contract. The hospital could then choose whether to file a quantum
meruit action for the reasonable value of the services it provided, or perhaps negotiate some reasonable amount
with Plaintiffs, or simply determine it unfeasible to pursue account collections further in some instances. The
declarations sought would conclusively determine the validity of the hospital’s billing at Chargemaster rates.
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The fact that further proceedings are possible is recognized in the Declaratory Judgment Act (i.e., “further
relief”), as well as fully described in the Restatement 2 of Judgments.
The Declaratory Judgment Plaintiffs Seek Would Provide Substantial Relief To Class Members
Currently, the accounts of many self-pay patients billed at excessive Chargemaster rates wind up in
collection accounts which effectively enforce payment of accounts billed at excessive Chargemaster rates for
individuals afraid of having their credit ruined. A patient has no defense against credit agency collection activity
and ruined credit. The declarations sought in the instant action, however, would provide the maximum relief
possible for class members by effectively invalidating the billing under “open price term” Contracts, and
ongoing collection activity for many self-pay patients. While the hospital would still be entitled to the
“reasonable value” of its services, a favorable ruling would invalidate improper collection activities for accounts
with outstanding balances and place the burden of proving the amounts owing on the hospital in quantum meruit,
where such burden belongs.
The bills issued to Plaintiffs are not theoretical or hypothetical
Defendant makes the ludicrous assertion that Plaintiffs have not established that an actual controversy
exists between the parties. This statement simply disregards the fact that the hospital visits are real, the
treatment provided is real, the signed contracts are real, the resulting bills are real, the outstanding balances are
real, collection activity is continuing, etc. Any argument that the outstanding controversy is theoretical or
hypothetical is nonsense. The further argument raised by Defendant, that the decrees requested would not be of
a conclusive nature is equally meritless. The declarations sought would invalidate outstanding contracts and
collection accounts.
Defendant’s Arguments Fail To Provide Any Basis For The Court’s Contract Interpretation
Defendant claims that the court below “Did Not Fail to Consider the Plain Language of the Agreement”
but Defendant fails to support its claim. Indeed, Defendant offers nothing to show that the court below
considered or even mentioned the “plain language” of the Agreement. Defendants fail to explain how the term
“all charges” could possibly be construed as having the plain meaning of “Chargemaster,” or why the “plain
meaning” standard should be ignored. The court itself made no analysis whatsoever as to the plain meaning of
the term “all charges,” or how patients would naturally interpret such term. Indeed, the court simply stated that
some other courts have interpreted similar language in other contracts to refer to a hospital’s Chargemaster.
Rather than address the issue, Defendant cites the lower court for its statement that Defendant’s Contract “is no
less clear and unambiguous than the language the Limberg court found was ‘definite and certain, referring to
Sanford’s Chargemaster rates.”
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Compliance With Federal Charity Requirements Is A Non-Sequitur
Defendant makes a brief argument that it complies with federal charity requirements, and that Plaintiffs
failed to prove they did not qualify for Charity Care. These arguments are so far off base and irrelevant as not to
merit a response.
Plaintiff Don’t Allege Ambiguity
Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs’ refer to extrinsic evidence in its brief that this court should not
consider because the Contract terms at issue are not ambiguous. According to Defendant, this court should not
consider the statements made by Plaintiffs that most patients have never heard of a Chargemaster, and that
patients covered by a government or private health care plan pay for services based on discounted, pre-existing
rate schedules. These arguments by Defendant are a red herring. Plaintiffs offer such information to enlighten
the court and to show that there are disputed issues of fact to consider, not as hard evidence of existing fact.
Further, Defendant has not offered even a scintilla of evidence to show that most emergency room patients are
aware of Defendant’s Chargemaster and have knowingly agreed to pay for hospital services in accordance with
the “gross charges” contained in Defendant’s Chargemaster. Further, it is widely recognized and indisputable
that payment rates for Medicare and Medicaid patients are set by governmental entities, and payment rates for
insured patients are set by negotiated contracts.
The Court Below Completely Ignored Idaho’s Standard For”Incorporation by Reference”
As extensively argued by Plaintiffs, Defendant’s Contract fails to “incorporate by reference” the
hospital’s Chargemaster as the pricing schedule for hospital services. The court below simply failed to address
this critical issue, which is clear legal error. Defendant, in its responsive papers, states that there was no need for
the lower court “to hold that the Chargemaster was incorporated by reference into the Agreement in order to hold
that the term ‘all charges’ means the hospital’s standard charges, contained in its Chargemaster.” This argument
is meritless, irrelevant, and ignores the purpose and intent of the following “incorporation by reference”
standards clearly established under Idaho law:
"For the terms of another document to be incorporated into the document executed by the parties the
reference must be clear and unequivocal, the reference must be called to the attention of the other party
and he must consent thereto, and the terms of the incorporated document must be known or easily
available to the contracting parties."
The purpose of Idaho’s “incorporation by reference” standards is to guarantee that both parties to a
Contract have a clear understanding as what is being agreed to. The incorporation of an outside document into a
Contract makes the incorporated document part and parcel of the Contract. In the instant action, Defendant’s
Consent Agreement fails to describe, identify, or even mention the hospital’s Chargemaster, much less contain a
“clear and unequivocal” reference to Defendant’s Chargemaster. The Agreement also fails to call to a patient’s
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attention the Chargemaster as the pricing term for services. Further, Defendant

proper evidentiary showing, that the Chargemaster

and

it is

is

makes n0 argument, much

easily available for review

by an emergency room patient,

not.

Defendant additionally argues that the Chargemaster

much

provides n0 facts 0r evidence,

less

undisputed

is

incorporated by reference into the Contract, but

support such claim. Defendant simply states that

facts, t0

“[Bjy signing the Agreement, Plaintiﬁfs agreed t0 “abide by theﬁnancialpolicies relating t0
obligations,

argument
term

less a

“all

is

”

which

Plaintiﬁfs

acknowledged were “available

meritless since the term “ﬁnancial policies”

charges”

is

undeﬁned.

On its face,

is

in the registration

my payment

area and upon request.

”

another generic, totally undeﬁned term, just as

This
is

the

the term “ﬁnancial policies” doesn’t even arguably refer t0

Defendant’s Chargemaster as the “pricing term” 0f the Contract.

Nor could “ﬁnancial

policies” even logically be

interpreted as Defendant’s Chargemaster, since the term applies equally t0 Medicare, Medicaid, and Insured
patients, all

0f Whom are

known t0 be

subj ect t0 pricing schedules other than Defendant’s Chargemaster.

Defendant’s further argument that signing the Contract constitutes an acknowledgment that Defendant’s

“Chargemaster”

is

easily available

absurd, since the Chargemaster

is

not even mentioned in the signed

is

Contract.
In

any event, even

for hospital services 0r

if the

was

Contract speciﬁcally referenced Defendant’s Chargemaster as the pricing term

interpreted as doing s0 (Which

Chargemaster was available for Viewing (Which
the Chargemaster

is,

The

its

less

and even

doesn’t),

doesn’t), there

0r has ever been, available in the

Defendant provides no evidence, much
reference into

it

it

would

emergency room

undisputed

facts,

showing

still

if the

Contract stated the

remain a factual issue as t0 Whether

for a patient’s Viewing. In essence,

that

its

Chargemaster

is

incorporated by

Contract and the court below simply ignored the incorporation by reference issue altogether.

court’s ruling as t0 the unconscionability 0f Defendant’s billing practices

While the court was furnished With a copy of the Contract
Dismiss, the court acknowledges that
practices? This case remains in

its

it

at issue

is

improper 0n

along With Defendant’s Motion t0

infancy,

and there

is

n0 discovery conducted and n0 record whatsoever

Defendant’s Motion t0 Dismiss as a motion for

cite t0.

in the record because

Summary Judgment.

In

no discovery had taken place

its

Motion

at the

to Dismiss,

treat

Defendant did not

time and there was no record t0

There are n0 depositions, admissions, declarations, or afﬁdavits and Defendant has not even answered

the complaint. Despite the complete lack 0f any evidentiary record

0n Which

t0 rule, the

lower court

nevertheless found that Defendant’s billing practices, including the failure t0 incorporate any price term in

ZAS

that

as to the Contract Interpretation issue. Indeed,

Defendant never moved for Summary Judgment, and both parties opposed the court’s decision t0

any materials

face

received n0 evidence 0f any kind With respect t0 Defendant’s billing

would even arguably support a Summary Judgment other than

cite to

its

set forth in the

“The Court found

its

lower court’s ruling:

that in addressing the

motion

to dismiss,

it

would be considering materials outside

the pleadings as

submitted by the defendant and therefore the matter should be addressed by applying summary judgment standards once
the plaintiffs had an opportunity to respond to the Declaration of Keely E. Duke. Both parties subsequently ﬁled
additional

memoranda.

No

additional evidence
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was submitted.”

form Contract, the billing of self-pay patients based on a grossly excessive rate schedule not authorized or agreed
upon, and the failure to provide patients with a copy of the signed Contract at the time of signing or upon
discharge, were not unconscionable as a “matter of law.”
There is no doubt that with regard to a Summary Judgment Motion, Defendant bears the initial burden of
proving the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact and has submitted no evidence to do so. A party
asserting that a fact cannot be genuinely disputed must support the assertion by citing to particular parts of
materials in the record, such as pleadings, depositions, admissions, declarations, and affidavits or by showing an
adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact” and Defendant has done neither with
respect to Plaintiffs’ unconscionability theory. I.R.C.P. 56(c)(1). Nor has Defendant established, or even
attempted to establish, the absence of evidence on an element that the Plaintiffs will be required to prove at trial.
In simple terms, Defendant has not established anything and the court’s ruling as to the unconscionability is
premature and inappropriate.
Defendant cites to Celutex in support of the court’s Summary Judgment ruling. However, Celutex is
readily distinguishable. In Celutex, the court expressly stated that “The parties had conducted discovery, and no
serious claim can be made that respondent was in any sense "railroaded" by a premature motion for summary
judgment.” Just the opposite is true in the instant action, where there was no opportunity for Plaintiffs to
conduct discovery, and the court’s decision to convert Defendant’s motion into a Summary Judgment motion,
prior to any discovery and with no record to base a ruling on, simply “railroaded” Plaintiffs by a premature
motion for summary judgment which was expressly what the Supreme Court had expressed concern over. The
fact that the court below forced this premature motion upon the parties only makes matters worse, and certainly
does nothing to make the premature proceedings proper. Further, even if this appellate court were to find that
conducting Summary Judgment proceedings with a near total lack of evidence was proper (which it should not),
the factual dispute as to unconscionability of the Contract itself would be sufficient to raise a genuine issue of
disputed fact as to “unconscionable billing practices” of Defendant.
In the court’s initial Memorandum Decision, the court, after indicating that it would treat Defendant’s
Motion as a Motion for Summary Judgment, gave Plaintiffs 30 days to submit a “supplemental response and any
materials relevant to the court’s consideration,” after which Defendant would have 30 days to file a sur-reply.
The court’s Memorandum decision made no mention of unconscionability, provided no mention or opportunity
for any discovery, and requested no further briefing as to the Plaintiffs’ unconscionability theory. In the Court’s
subsequent order, which is appealed herein, the court changed course and ruled as to both Plaintiffs’ “contract
interpretation” theory and “unconscionability theory.” While Plaintiffs anticipated the Court to rule on the
Contract interpretation issue based on its Memorandum decision, the court’s subsequent ruling on Plaintiffs’
“Unconscionability theory” in the complete absence of any record came as a complete surprise, and is unjustified
and legally erroneous.
Since the court had no evidence before it as to unconscionability and requested none, Plaintiffs had no
reason to suspect that their “unconscionability theory” would be considered as part of the Summary Judgment
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proceedings 0r they would be required t0 submit some undescribed additional brieﬁng in response to a motion

never made by Defendant 0n an issue never raised by the court. Further, even

of unconscionability as appropriately considered in

treat the issue

if this appellate court decides t0

this appeal, there is zero

evidence to support

the conclusion 0f the court below, and the lower court’s ruling should be reversed for that reason alone. In
essence, With n0 discovery, n0 depositions, n0 declarations 0r afﬁdavits, and not even an answer to the complaint,
there

is

n0

Judgment

basis t0 support a
as to this issue

is

ﬁnding as

t0 the conscionability 0f Defendant’s billing practices s0 the

erroneous.

Defendant Claims That Plaintiffs Have Waived Any Objection
a Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiffs

Summary

have no obj ection

t0

Hearing Defendants Dismissal Motion as

t0 this court independently conducting its

own review and ruling 0n the two

separate theories set forth in the complaint. Regarding the Contract interpretation issue, an obviously
reversible conclusion

was reached by the

Summary Judgment ruling was based on

court below.

wrong and

With regard t0 the “unconscionability theory,” the

insufﬁcient evidence and should be reversed as well.

Defendant Fails T0 Support The Court’s Reliance 0n the Sanford and DiCarlo Cases

The Sanford and DiCarlo cases

are heavily relied

upon by

the Court as being non-binding but instructive.

Unfortunately, both of the cases are poorly reasoned and wrongly decided, as fully explained in Plaintiffs’

opening

Defendant’s opposition appellate brief simply repeats

brief.

much 0f the same language taken from

these cases almost verbatim, but fails t0 address the obvious deﬁciencies in these two cases raised in Plaintiffs’

Opening

brief.

Nor does

the court below, 0r Defendant’s brief, attempt t0 distinguish 0r discredit the several

well thought out cases cited by Plaintiff in
that

its

moving papers

in

Which hospital agreements similar

in nature to

0f Defendant’s were found t0 contain an “open price term.”

Defendant’s Attempt t0 Refute Plaintiff’s Arguments As T0 The Court’s Failure In Interpreting The
Contract Properly Under Idaho Law Is Meritless

Defendant notes that
First, there is

Plaintiffs attack the

lower court’s contract analysis for three speciﬁc reasons:

not analysis of the “plain” language 0f the Agreement. Second, the court failed to consider

the parties’ intent. Third, the court failed to address the incorporation

by reference

doctrine.

Intent 0f the Parties

Defendant argues that the Contract’s
the parties does not matter

“all

charges” term

Where the wording of the Contract

is

is

not “ambiguous,” and that the intent of

not ambiguous. Plaintiff would agree to the

extent that the “subj ective intent” 0f the parties to a Contract doesn’t matter. In the instant action, the term
“all

charges” as

it

appears in the Contract

unambiguously does not
term

“all

is

unambiguous

refer to Defendant’s

for purposes 0f this action in that

Chargemaster as the pricing term for hospital services. The

charges” appears in the following sentence: “I further understand and agree that

responsible for payment of all charges incurred Which are not paid
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it

I

am ﬁnancially

by any Third—Party Payors.” In

essence, there
t0

is

no ambiguity

in the fact that the

any speciﬁc pricing schedule

term

“all

charges”

is

not intended by either party to refer

any category of patient, and certainly cannot be reasonably interpreted

for

To

as a reference t0 Defendant’s Chargemaster as the pricing term for signing patients.
“all

charges”

is

unambiguous, but only in a negative sense.

The Whole premise 0f Defendant’s argument
parties is always the

maj 0r issue

as to ambiguity

in contract interpretation,

is

pointless in any case. Intent 0f the

Whether 0r not there

ambiguity in a Contract

is

provision. However, for the adhesive, form Contract at issue herein, the subjective

0f an individual patient
its

is

not relevant.

ruling, the court doesn’t

makes no

term

that extent the

It is

even mention

(i.e.,

unexpressed) intent

an “objective” or “reasonable patient” standard that applies. In

this

key component 0f “intent”

in

its

contract interpretation, and

analysis as to the intent 0f either party to the agreement. Defendant ignores the issue entirely.

Defendant, in footnote

3,

argues that “the intent 0f the parties must be derived from the plain

language of the Agreement. Defendant uses a single Contract for

all patients,

most 0f whom

are

subject t0 pre-existing price schedules, such as Medicare, Medicaid, and negotiated rate schedules, not

Chargemaster

rates.

Thus, Defendant

is

well aware that the term “all charges”

is

generic in nature, and

not a reference to a speciﬁc payment schedule. The Contract clearly establishes payment

liability,

but

without stating the payment rate 0r schedule applicable t0 any given patient3 For a patient not even

aware 0f the existence 0f a Chargemaster, the intent cannot be

when such prices

t0

be bound by

its

prices, particular

are about 3 times the hospitals average reimbursement rates.

Incorporation by Reference

The
reference,”

ruling 0f the court

Which was

below does not mention the well established doctrine 0f “incorporation by
and argued

fully briefed

to the court below. Defendant, for

its part,

ﬁrst argues that

doesn’t matter Whether or not the Defendant’s Contract incorporated the Chargemaster. This argument

wrong, and

is

conclude that
order t0

not supported
it is

bill at

by

logic 0r case law. Defendant next argues that even if this court

Chargemaster

rates,

Defendant claims that the Contract does, in
(1) the

convincing argument that the Chargemaster

critical

“'readily available for inspection”

is

fact,

incorporate the

fails t0

provide any evidentiary showing 0r

“adequately identified” in the Contract (Which

by an emergency room

patient (which

it is

not).

it

isn’t),

Despite

or

its

importance, the incorporation by reference argument was entirely ignored by the court below, and

Defendant provided no argument or explanation

On its

t0

terms to be incorporated are adequately identiﬁed and (2) readily

availablefor inspection by the parties. However, Defendant

it is

is

necessary for the Contract to “incorporate by reference” the hospital’s Chargemaster in

Chargemaster by reference because

that

were

it

face, the Contract does not “incorporate

to help the court

With

its

failure to consider the issue at all.

by reference” Defendant’s Chargemaster, and Without such

3For example, Medicare and Medicaid patients are subj ect to pre-existing, governmentally mandated rate schedules, and
insured patients are subj ect to insurer
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(i.e.

third party) negotiated rate schedules.

incorporation, the court’s ruling

must be reversed. Indeed, reversal would

still

be required even

if the

Contract term “all charges” was interpreted as referring to the Chargemaster, since the requirements for
incorporating a document

by

reference, even those stated

Unconscionability Is Not Appropriate For

above by Defendant, are not met.

A Summary Judgment

In the instant action, the complaint states the second theory of the case as t0 unconscionability as
follows: “Defendantis‘ practice ofbilling self-pay patients based 0n the grossly excessive charges listed in
its

“Charge Description Master” (hereinafter “Chargemaster rates ”)

agreement
this issue,

charges

t0 pay at

is

unconscionable, so that any

such rates would be unenforceable.” The court, With no evidence

and n0 basis on which

t0 rule, nevertheless ruled that the alleged billing

was not “unconscionable”

as a matter 0f law. This ruling

is

at all

submitted on

of grossly excessive

clear legal error.

Defendant brieﬂy argues that the lower court’s summary adjudication as to “Unconscionability”
should be upheld based on the decision in Celotex, Which puts upon the nonmovant in a groperly brought

Summary Judgment proceeding the burden
nonmovant has

the burden 0f proof at

trial.

the case, including the fact that the court

of Unconscionability. After the

initial

request 0f Defendant), indicated that

it

t0

show

a dispute as t0 a material issue of fact where the

Defendant’s argument ignores the unusual procedural status 0f

had before

it

n0 evidence submitted by

hearing, the court,

0n

its

own motion

either party as t0 the issue

(and against the expressed

intended to treat Defendant’s Motion as a

Summary Judgment

Motion, based on the fact that Defendant had furnished a copy of Defendant’s Contract as part 0f
Defendant’s moving papers. In

its

ruling, the court discussed the disputed Contract issue but said nothing

about the “Unconscionability” allegations 0f the complaint, including the alleged “grossly excessive billing”

by Defendant. Indeed, the word “unconscionability” nowhere appears
decision. Further, the

30 day period provided

in the court’s initial

for Plaintiffs to “ﬁle a supplemental response

materials relevant to this court's consideration of this motion as a motion for
I.R.C.P.

memorandum
and any

summary judgment pursuant t0

56” did not allow for or contemplate any discovery by either party in order to acquire evidence for

the subsequent hearing,

Which the court made

optional.

The

court’s subsequent

Summary Judgment

favor 0f Defendant on both the Contract Interpretation theory and the Unconscionability theory
as a matter 0f law,

and procedurally improper as well.
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is

in

erroneous

As

set forth in

Rocky Mt. Power

v.

Jensen, 154 Idaho 549 (2012):

Summary Judgment is proper "ifthe pleadings, depositions, and admissions onﬁle, together with
the aﬂidavits, ifcmy, show that there is n0 genuine issue as t0 any materialfact and that the moving
party is entitled t0 ajudgment as a matter oflaw. "I.R.C.P. 56(6). Movant has the burden 0f
showing that n0 genuine issues ofmaterialfact exist. Stoddart v. Pocatello Sch. Dist. N0. 25, I49
Idaho 679, 683, 239 P.3d 784, 788 (2010). "When a motionfor summaryjudgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations 0r
denials 0fthatparly’s pleadings, but the party's response, by aﬂidavits 0r as otherwise provided in
this rule, must setforth speciﬁcfacts showing that there is a genuine issuefor trial. Ifthe party does
not s0 respond, summaryjudgment, gfappropriate, shall be entered against the party. "I.R.C.P. 56(6).

A similar statement of the rule is set forth in M & H Rentals
Summarjyjudgment should not be granted when
together with the afﬁdavits, ifany,

"

show

v.

Sales, 108 Idaho

"the pleadings, depositions,

the existence

ofcm

567 (1985):

and admissions 0n ﬁle,

issue ofmalerialfact. I.R. C.P. 56(6).

However, I.R.C.P. 56(e) mandates that "[w]hen a motion for summaryjudgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations 0r
denials ofhis pleadings, but his response, by aﬂidavits 0r as otherwise provided in this rule, must

setforth Speciﬁcfacts showing that there

A

is

a genuine issuefar

trial.

”

motionfor summarjyjudgment Shall be renderedforthwith ifthe pleadings, depositions, and

admissions onﬁle, together with the afﬁdavits, ifany, show that there is n0 genuine issue as t0 any
materialfact and that the movingparly is entitled t0 ajudgment as a matter oflaw. Idaho R. Civ. P.

Upon a motionfor summaryjudgment,

all disputedfacts are liberally construed infavor 0f
The burden ofproving the absence ofa materialfact rests at all times upon
the moving party. This burden is onerous because even circumstantial evidence can create a genuine

56(0).

the non-movingparly.

issue ofmaterialfact.

Taken
all

together, these cases clarify that the

time upon the moving party, the burden

moving

onerous,

all facts

The court ignored
do

acknowledged

all

so.

0f these requirements and pulled

its

fact rests at

are liberally construed in favor of the non-

and the motion for summary judgment must be made and supported as provided

party,

legal basis to

is

burden of proving the absence 0f a material

Summary Judgment ruling

in this rule.

out of thin air With no

Further, With regard t0 unconscionability, the Contract alone, along With the

billing

0f Plaintiffs

at

Chargemaster

rates, is sufﬁcient t0 create a triable issue

of fact as to

Unconscionability of Defendant’s billing practices.

Defendant Does Not Address The Problems Pointed Out By Plaintiffs’ Opening Appellate Brief As t0
Court’s Ruling On Either Procedural 0r Substantive Unconscionability

The court based

its

ruling as to unconscionability purely

evidence, while entirely ignoring the lack of evidence submitted
essence, the court acknowledged that
Plaintiffs, the

failure

it

on the

fact that Plaintiffs did not

by Defendant

gave no consideration as t0 the

w

in support

submit

of its motion. In

of hospital services provided t0

reasonableness offhe Chargemaster rates relative to the value 0f services provided, the

0f Defendant’s Contract to clearly identify any pricing term or schedule,
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etc.

Without such evidence,

the court lacked any basis

on Which

to rule.

Rather than simply denying the

to Unconscionability, the court stated that “there has

been no evidence presented [by

Chargemaster rates are unreasonable for the services rendered.” This ruling

had n0 burden

t0

come

Summary Judgment motion

forth With evidence as to Unconscionability Without

is

Summary Judgment ruling
is

erroneous on

that there

its

as to Unconscionability.

face, given the clear indicia

Plaintiffs] that the

erroneous because Plaintiffs

any reasonable opportunity

conduct discovery, and Defendant’s brief offers no argument as to any evidence
for the court t0 consider. Indeed, Defendants don’t

as

at all

to

being before the court

even suggest there was any evidence on Which to base a

The

court’s

ﬁnding 0f no procedural unconscionability

0f procedural unconscionability, and the court’s conclusion

was no degree 0f substantive unconscionability

is

erroneous because there was n0 evidentiary

support in the record to support such a conclusion. The Motion for

Summary Judgment in Defendant’s

favor as to Plaintiffs’ unconscionability theory fails as a matter 0f law and should be reversed.

Defendant Refers t0 Irrelevant State and Federal Laws Not Mentioned In The Court’s Ruling
Defendant makes a
its

brief, irrelevant

argument as

t0 the existence

0f state and federal laws t0 justify

conduct, claiming that such laws already comprehensively speak t0 the issues that Plaintiffs ask the

Court t0 address here, and further claiming they reﬂect a series of important policy balances upon which the
entirety

of hospital economics

rests.

aﬁeld from any 0f the issues before

This argument
this court as to

is

a total non-sequitur, not

made by the

court,

and so

far

not merit any response.

CONCLUSION
For

all

of the reasons

state

above, this Court should reverse the ruling 0f the lower court and

ﬁnd

an “open price term,” and further reverse the ruling 0f the lower court

that Defendants’ Contract contains

With regard to “Unconscionability 0f Defendant’s billing practices” on the basis that there was insufﬁcient
evidence before the court t0
Dated:

November

1,

make

a ﬁnding 0n the matter.

2019.

CRANDALL LAW OFFICE
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W.
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